Background: free choice, exclusion and inclusion. Disjunctions in the scope of possibility modals, as in (1), give rise to a conjunctive inference, generally labeled 'free choice' (Kamp 1974).
Every girl can eat cake or ice-cream every girl can eat cake and every girl can eat icecream
No girl must eat both cake and ice-cream every girl can avoid cake and every girl can avoid ice-cream (2) is predicted by exclusion-based approaches (together with the assumptions that implicatures can be computed locally), but (3) is not. On these grounds, Bar-Lev and Fox 2017 (BL&F) propose a novel theory of free choice, which can also account for (3). BL&F's account directly adds some information to the assertion (inclusion), in addition to the standard exclusion of alternatives. More precisely: BL&F's algorithm works by including all alternatives that are not innocently excludable (in the sense of Fox 2007) and that are compatible with the assertion and the negation of the innocently excludable alternatives. 1 A novel case. We investigated a similar pair of sentences involving disjunction in the scope of non-monotonic quantifiers as in (4) and (5). (4) is generally assumed to have a reading (call it ' ---') on which disjunction is read conjunctively in the upward entailing component of the quantifier, and disjunctively in the downward entailing one. This reading suggests that one girl has free choice between cake and ice-cream, and no other girl can eat either of the two. Both exclusion-and inclusion-based theories of free choice can predict this reading.
(4)
Exactly one Katzir's (2007) .) As illustrated in Fig. 2 , the alternatives Exacly one girl is not allowed to have cake/ice-cream end up being includable. Their inclusion is the source of the ---reading of (5). (This derivation also generalises to exactly n cases, provided the corresponding existential alternatives are in the set of alternatives and the alternatives exactly n for n s different from n are instead not part of that set.) Given the similarity between the two sentences and the difference in predictions between exclusion-based and inclusion-based theories, the pair in (4)/(5) can serve as an important test for theories of free choice. The Experiment: We investigated this pair of sentences experimentally using an inferential task, building on recent experimental work with free choice inferences (Chemla 2009, Gotzner and Romoli 2017 a.o.). The design was a 2x4 with each of the two types of sentences (4) and (5), call it ' ' and ' ,' respectively, presented in four inference conditions: , , -and -. The first two conditions are simple baseline for truth and falsity, while the third one is a baseline for compatibility with the target sentence, i.e. the presented statement is simply compatible with the sentence but not an inference (cf. Gotzner and Romoli 2017). The comparison between the compatible and the free choice condition in both the and -variants is a measure of their potential free choice readings. 4 An example of each condition is given in Table 1 . In our experiments, 60 participants saw sentences like (4) and (5) across the four inference conditions (in four different scenarios). We asked participants if and to what extent they would infer a given candidate inference on a scale from 0 to 100%, with 0% representing that a statement did not follow and 100% that it definitely followed. Results & Discussion: The graph in Fig.1 below shows the mean % of responses across conditions. We ran a mixed model analysis with sum coding of all factors. The model revealed main effects for all comparisons, with the true condition being rated highest, followed by the free choice, compatible, and false conditions (all p-values <.0001). Crucially, the free choice condition was endorsed more than the compatible condition in both polarity conditions. While there was a significant interaction across polarity in the false condition (p <.01), no interaction between the and cases in the -conditions was found (p = .35). These results suggest that (4) has a reading with free choice, as predicted by most exclusion-based implicature theories: the free choice condition was differing from both the compatible and the false condition. Crucially, we found parallel differences in the case of (5), suggesting that participants computed the free choice inference to a similar extent in the positive and negative polarity conditions. Conclusion We tested sentences like (4) and (5) to investigate the status of their potential ---and ---readings. In our results, we found clear evidence for both readings. These results are challenging for the exclusion-based implicature theories of free choice, but in line with inclusion-based accounts like BL&F 2017, which can predict both readings. The pair in (4) and (5) constitutes, therefore, a further important argument for inclusionbased accounts. (5) is globally exhaustified the key alternatives (Exactly one cannot take syntax, Exactly one cannot take semantics) are excludable and their negation doesn't lead to the above reading. It is easy to show that also local exhaustification in the scope of the quantifier doesn't help i.e. it gives rise to readings that are too weak in the upward-entailing component of the meaning. 4 To ensure that the compatible condition really served as a baseline for compatibility we had two versions of the compatible conditions with identical sentences but different polarity in the second conjunct. Therefore, if participants were to endorse one version they certainly would not endorse its negation. Ratings of the two versions did not differ significantly, therefore in the graph below we present an average of the two versions of the compatible condition. ). The rate of endorsement reflects the degree to which a candidate inference follows. Error bars represent . 
